Quantum low probability of intercept transmits ciphertext in a way that prevents an eavesdropper possessing the decryption key from recovering the plaintext. It is capable of Gbps communication rates on optical fiber over metropolitan-area distances. Quantum computers may render many conventional cryptosystems insecure. Quantum key distribution and post-quantum cryptography are possible solutions to this threat, but they offer no protection against an adversary who has bribed a code clerk to obtain access to decryption keys. We introduce quantum low probability of intercept (QLPI), which has the potential to solve the key-disclosure problem. It transmits a ciphertext and leaves an individual-attack eavesdropper with an error-ridden version from which the plaintext cannot be recovered even knowing the key.
Quantum computers may render many conventional cryptosystems insecure. Quantum key distribution and post-quantum cryptography are possible solutions to this threat, but they offer no protection against an adversary who has bribed a code clerk to obtain access to decryption keys. We introduce quantum low probability of intercept (QLPI), which has the potential to solve the key-disclosure problem. It transmits a ciphertext and leaves an individual-attack eavesdropper with an error-ridden version from which the plaintext cannot be recovered even knowing the key.
QLPI is a repurposed version of floodlight QKD (FL-QKD) [1] - [5] , in which the latter's key distribution goal has been replaced with the former's low probability of intercept objective. As such, QLPI inherits FL-QKD's immunity to passive eavesdropping, and Gbps transmission capability without the need for new technology. A schematic of QLPI is shown in Fig. 1 . Alice transmits low-brightness (<1 photon per mode), broadband, amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) light to Bob, obtained by tapping a small portion of the ASE output from a high-gain optical amplifier, while retaining the remaining high-brightness ( 1 photon per mode) ASE for use in her receiver. Bob employs binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) to modulate the light he receives with a forward error-correction (FEC) encoded version of his ciphertext. He then passes his modulated light through a high-gain optical amplifier, and sends the amplified modulated light back to Alice. Alice does broadband homodyne detection of the light she receives from Bob-using her stored highbrightness ASE light as the local oscillator (LO)-and successfully recovers his ciphertext because her biterror probability is below the FEC threshold. A passive-eavesdropping Eve who captures all the light lost in the Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice channels will have a bit-error probability that is well above the FEC threshold, because she cannot produce a high-brightness reference beam from the light she tapped from the Aliceto-Bob channel. Consequently, she will be unable to reliably intercept the ciphertext, much less decrypt it. Because QLPI is a two-way protocol, it is vulnerable to active eavesdropping, in which Eve injects her own light into Bob's terminal, while saving a reference beam to recover Bob's ciphertext from the light she taps from the Bob-to-Alice channel. QLPI defeats active eavesdropping by means of channel monitoring [1] , [2] , which relies on photon pairs from a spontaneous parametric downconverter (SPDC) in Alice's terminal. This monitoring enables Alice and Bob to determine f E , the fraction of light entering Bob's terminal that is due to Eve. They can then decide whether Eve's intrusion warrants aborting the protocol, because her error probability is below the FEC threshold, or that they are secure, because Eve's error probability is above the FEC threshold.
To illustrate QLPI's robustness to passive and active eavesdropping, consider individual attacks on the following strawman system. Alice's transmission to Bob has 2 THz bandwidth and brightness chosen to ensure that her raw bit-error probability will be 0.1 when she and Bob are connected by a pair of L-km-long, 0.2-dB/km-loss optical fibers. Bob converts his plaintext message to ciphertext, and protects that ciphertext from transmission errors by means of a rate-1/2 non-systematic code whose FEC threshold is slightly above 0.1 by an amount sufficient to ensure error-free decoding by Alice when her raw bit-error probability is at most 0.1. Bob sends that encoded ciphertext to Alice by 2 Gbps BPSK modulation of the light he received from her, followed by 40-dB-gain optical amplification. Alice demodulates the light she has received from Bob-by 90% efficient homodyne detection using her bright, 2-THz-bandwidth, stored-reference beam as the LO-to obtain the FEC-encoded ciphertext with a 0.1 raw bit-error probability. She then applies the FEC decoder to obtain the error-free ciphertext. After that, she decrypts the ciphertext to recover Bob's plaintext message. Figure 2 (a) plots, versus the one-way path length L between Alice and Bob, three bit-error probability results for Eve's passive eavesdropping attack: Pr(e) UB Eve , the Chernoff upper bound on the bit-error probability for Eve's optimum quantum receiver; Pr(e) Eve , the bit-error probability for the ideal-equipment version of Eve's best known-implementation receiver; and Pr(e) LB Eve , the Bhattacharyya lower bound on the bit-error probability for Eve's optimum quantum receiver. Here, it has been assumed that Eve gets all the light that is lost in transmission between Alice and Bob, e.g., for L = 50 km, Eve is getting 90% of the light Alice sends to Bob and 90% of the light Bob sends to Alice. Nevertheless, for all one-way path lengths between 10 and 50 km, Eve's error probability with an optimum quantum receiver is far above the FEC threshold for Bob's code.
FEC threshold for Bob's code. Consequently, Eve's passive-eavesdropping individual attack cannot a ord her anything other than an exceedingly error-ridden version of Bob's FEC-encoded ciphertext from which she will have little chance of recovering any of Bob's plaintext, even if she had his decryption key.
Figure 2(b) shows how this outstanding LPI performance is obtained. It plots the brightness (photons/s-Hz) of the light Alice sends to Bob, and the photons per bit that Bob receives from that transmission, versus the one-way path length, L. Alice's <0.01 photon/s-Hz signal brightness for 10 km  L  50 km denies the passive eavesdropping Eve a suitable reference for acquiring Bob's FEC-protected ciphertext from the ASE produced by his amplifier in which it is buried. But, the 2-THz bandwidth of Alice's transmission to Bob and Bob's 0.5-ns bit duration imply that he receives ⇠0.84 photon per bit. Thus, because his amplifier overcomes the return-path loss, and Alice's bright-reference homodyne receiver enjoys an M = 0.5 ns ⇥ 2 THz = 1000-fold processing gain, she has no trouble in maintaining a raw bit-error probability below the FEC threshold. Pr(e)
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Pr(e) Eve , is the Cherno upper bound for Eve's optimum quantum receiver; middle curve, Pr(e) Eve , is the bit-error probability for the ideal-equipment version of Eve's best known-implementation receiver; and bottom curve, Pr(e) LB Eve , is the Bhattacharyya lower bound for Eve's optimum quantum receiver. (b) The brightness (photons/s-Hz) of the signal light Alice transmits to Bob, and the photons per bit that Bob receives from Alice, plotted versus one-way path length.
Active Attack
The most potent form of active eavesdropping on QLPI-one that Bob cannot detect by monitoring the spectrum of his received light-is the same as the most potent active eavesdropping attack on FL-QKD, namely, the SPDC light-injection attack [11] . In this attack, Eve uses an SPDC to create quadrature-entangled signal and idler beams, injects her signal beam into Bob's terminal, and uses her retained idler as a reference beam for recovering Bob's ciphertext from light she has tapped from the Bob-to-Alice channel. Alice and Bob's coincidence-based channel monitoring, however, can accurately determine f E as shown in Fig. 3(a) , which presents channel monitoring results from a table-top FL-QKD experiment [12] . It follows that they can either determine whether Eve's f E value would a ord her a bit-error probability below the FEC threshold, or is such that her bit-error probability is well above that threshold. In the former instance, Alice and Bob deem Eve's intrusion to be a denial-of-service attack, and so they abort the QLPI protocol. In the latter case, Alice and Bob know that Eve has not acquired a useful version of Bob's encrypted ciphertext. Figure 3(b) illustrates the e ectiveness of channel monitoring in defeating Eve's SPDC light-injection attack by plotting three bit-error probability results for that attack; see Appendix B for more information. Here we have assumed the strawman system from Sec. 3.1, only with Alice having adjusted her signal brightness to maintain a 0.1 error probability when f E = 0.02, which is an f E value that is well within the demonstrated sensitivity of Alice and Bob's channel monitoring. The topmost curve, Pr(e) UB Eve , is the Cherno upper bound on the bit-error probability for Eve's optimum quantum receiver. The middle curve, Pr(e) Eve , is the bit-error probability for the ideal-equipment version of Eve's best known-implementation receiver. The bottom curve, Pr(e) LB Eve , is the Bhattacharyya lower bound on the bit-error probability for Eve's optimum quantum receiver. For all one-way path lengths between 10 and 50 km, Eve's error probability with an optimum quantum receiver -whose implementation has yet to be proposed, much less realized-is far above the FEC threshold for Bob's code, implying that her SPDC light-injection attack fails to recover a useful version of Bob's ciphertext. one-way path length (km)
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Pr(e) Eve (b) , is the Cherno upper bound for Eve's optimum quantum receiver; middle curve, Pr(e) Eve , is the bit-error probability for the ideal-equipment version of Eve's best known-implementation receiver; and bottom curve, Pr(e) LB Eve , is the Bhattacharyya lower bound for Eve's optimum quantum receiver.
Relevant precursor experiments
At this point, a brief elaboration on the relation between FL-QKD and QLPI is in order. QLPI is directly descended from FL-QKD in that they are functionally identical except for two rather significant di erences: (1) In QLPI Bob transmits an FEC-protected ciphertext to Alice, while in FL-QKD Bob sends her a random bit string. (2) QLPI's purpose is precluding an Eve from gaining access to Bob's ciphertext, whereas FL-QKD's goal is enabling Alice and Bob to share a one-time pad about which Eve learns nothing. This is why the FL-QKD experiments reported in [12, 13] are directly relevant to QLPI, and most of the theoretical work on FL-QKD [11, 14, 15] is also germane. That our FL-QKD theory is readily transferred to QLPI can be seen in Appendices A and B, where it provides what is needed to get the bit-error probability results presented in Figs. 2 and 3. On the experimental side, the table-top FL-QKD experiment reported in Ref.
[13] is equally important for QLPI in that it demonstrated a 1.3 Gbps inferred secret-key rate-against a frequency-domain collective attack-on a 10-dB-attenuation channel, which is equivalent to a Fig. 2 : Performance of a strawman QLPI system against Eve's (a) passive and (b) active eavesdropping attacks: Pr(e) UB Eve , is the Chernoff upper bound for Eve's optimum quantum receiver; Pr(e) Eve , is the bit-error probability for the ideal-equipment version of Eve's best known-implementation receiver; and Pr(e) LB Eve , is the Bhattacharyya lower bound for Eve's optimum quantum receiver.
Eve's most potent individual-attack active eavesdropping on QLPI is the SPDC light-injection attack in which Eve uses an SPDC to create quadrature-entangled signal and idler beams, injects her signal beam into Bob's terminal, and uses her retained idler as a reference beam for recovering Bob's ciphertext from light she has tapped from the Bob-to-Alice channel. Figure 2(b) illustrates the effectiveness of channel monitoring in defeating Eve's SPDC light-injection attack on the strawman QLPI system. It plots the active-attack bit-error probabilities Pr(e) UB Eve , Pr(e) Eve , and Pr(e) LB Eve under the assumption that Alice has adjusted her signal brightness to maintain a 0.1 error probability when f E = 0.02, which is an f E value well within the demonstrated sensitivity of Alice and Bob's channel monitoring [2] . For all one-way path lengths between 10 and 50 km, Eve's active-attack error probability with an optimum quantum receiver is far above the FEC threshold for Bob's code. 
